Sociocultural theories of development posit that higher cognitive functions emerge through socially mediated processes, in particular through language. However, theories of human communication posit that language itself is based on higher social cognitive skills and cooperative motivations. Prelinguistic communication is a test case to this puzzle. In the current review, I first present recent and new findings of a research program on prelinguistic infants' communication skills. This research provides empirical evidence for a rich social cognitive and motivational basis of human communication before language. Next, I discuss the emergence of these foundational skills. By considering all three lines of development, and by drawing on new findings from phylogenetic and cross-cultural comparisons, this article discusses the possibility that the cognitive foundations of prelinguistic communication are, in turn, mediated by social interactional input and shared experiences.
H uman cognition is unique and diverse in many ways. Interestingly, the complexities of human cognition emerged in such an evolutionarily short time span that they cannot easily be accounted for by natural evolution alone (e.g., Richerson & Boyd, 2005) . This has led to the argument and some intriguing evidence that the emergence of the complexities and unique aspects of human cognition can be reduced to the advent of a single foundational ability-namely, the understanding of others as intentional beings (Tomasello, 1999) , together with a cooperative motivation to interact with others ("shared intentionality"; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) . The argument is that these foundational social cognitive and social motivational skills led to species-specific ways of interacting, cumulating in modern human linguistic exchanges. These forms of human interaction and communication then enabled a faster cultural evolution of complex human cognition over a shorter historic period. Specifically, the advent of language transformed natural lines of cognition inherited from nonhuman ancestors into uniquely human forms of perspectival and dialogical thinking. Vygotsky (1962 Vygotsky ( , 1978 and Luria (1976) argued, and provided some evidence to show, that cognitive skills inherited from a natural (evolutionary) line of development interacted with cultural tools inherited from a sociohistoric line of development. Together, these two lines mediated the individual (ontogenetic) line of development. The central claim of Vygotsky's sociocultural theory of development was that every higher cognitive function first emerges on an interpersonal plane and then, through cultural mediation and internalization, on an intrapersonal plane. In particular, Vygotsky argued that language as a cultural tool mediates the ontogenetic emergence of higher cognitive functions. In support of this view, more recent cross-linguistic research has demonstrated how language influences cognition in various domains such as space, perception, and numerical knowledge (e.g., Boroditsky, 2009; Frank, Everett, Fedorenko, & Gibson, 2008; Haun et al., 2006; Levinson, 2003) . Social origins' views of human cognition thus propose that very few, if any, of humans' unique cognitive skills are a product of individual processes alone. Instead, they suggest that human complex cognition (Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975) , but the central question is whether communication before language is already underpinned by deeper cognitive and motivational processes that enable language acquisition in the first place. I will present a series of recent and new studies that show that prelinguistic infants indeed communicate in cognitively and motivationally richer ways than previously thought. These findings thus demonstrate that foundational social cognitive skills are not mediated by language, but instead emerge prior to and thus independently of language.
The second part of this article raises the question how, in turn, these foundational social and cognitive skills of prelinguistic communication emerge, in particular, in the absence of cultural and symbolic tools such as language. Answers to this question are still far from conclusive, but I will lay out some questions and discuss emerging empirical findings from recent and new phylogenetic and cross-cultural comparisons. The general standpoint will be that we need not defect a priori to a nativist or "core systems" stance in explaining the foundations of prelinguistic communication and cognition. Instead, it will be a useful exercise to consider again all three lines of development-the natural (evolutionary), the individual (ontogenetic), and the sociohistoric or cross-cultural lines-to investigate social processes in the ontogeny of prelinguistic communication and cognition.
PRELINGUISTIC FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN COMMUNICATION
Before they speak, infants communicate with various kinds of gestures. Of interest to our question is the most natural type of gestures, one that does not rely on codified and socially transmitted meaning. These are deictic gestures, such as showing and pointing, which work through ways of presenting others with an aspect in the environment, in the hope that others then figure out the intended message. Deictic communication therefore does not rely on semantics or symbol use. The advantage is that one can use the same gesture (e.g., pointing) to express a myriad of different things simply by presenting others with relevant aspects of the environment on the background of a shared current situation. However, deictic communication is heavily dependent on a deeper social cognitive understanding of others' intentionality and shared situations. Specifically, deictic communication requires an understanding of others' referential, social, and communicative intentions, that is, respectively, what aspect someone indicates, why that aspect is indicated, and that the two previous questions are triggered because of the communicative act (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007) .
Previous research has suggested that infants' deictic communication, in particular, the pointing gesture, which emerges around 12 months of age (Leung & Rheingold, 1981) , initially does not involve any of these cognitive and motivational complexities. Instead, the respective social cognitive understanding emerges only later, through parental scaffolding, pretty much in a way that socioconstructivist accounts of development would suggest (e.g., Carpendale & Lewis, 2004) . These cognitively "lean" hypotheses of infant pointing posited that initially (a) infants point noncommunicatively (Bates et al., 1975; Desrochers, Morissette, & Ricard, 1995) ; (b) pointing is nonreferential and does not involve a social cognitive understanding of the recipients' attention (Moore & D'Entremont, 2001) ; and (c) infants' motivation is mainly egocentric, to obtain objects or attention to the self (Bates et al., 1975; Gomez, Sarria, & Tamarit, 1993; Moore & D'Entremont, 2001) . Recently, my colleagues and I have tested these claims and shown in a series of studies that infant pointing instead already shares much, if not all, of the social and cognitive complexities of the adult version of this communicative act from the beginning.
Intention to Communicate
Twelve-month-olds use the pointing gesture intentionally to communicate. Two main sources of evidence come from a paradigm in which interesting events elicit infant pointing. We manipulated the experimenter's reaction either after or before the infant pointed. For example, the experimenter did not react to infants' pointing. In that case, infants persisted in their communicative goal and augmented their signal by repeating their pointing and increasing their vocalizations significantly more than when the adult typically reacted by sharing attention and interest (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano, & Tomasello, 2004) . This kind of persistence is indicative of pursuing the intention to communicate with others. Even more clearly, before infants initiated a point, they considered whether a recipient attended to them and so could see their point. When an adult turned sideways and did not look at infants (and so could not possibly see the pointing gesture), infants pointed significantly less to an interesting event than when the adult was turned toward them and so could see and react to their visual gesture (Liszkowski, Albrecht, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008) . These findings thus establish experimentally that 12-month-olds point with the intention to communicate.
It has been debated whether infants also point non-communicatively. Bates et al. (1975; Desrochers et al., 1995) claimed that infants' first points are noncommunicative and only develop into communicative pointing. But recently, Delgado, Gómez, and Sarriá (2009) showed that noncommunicative pointing does not cease but coexists with communicative pointing in older 3-to 6-year-old children. These authors suggest a dual function of pointing (i.e., communicative and private), analogously to a Vygotskian perspective on speech. However, in a recent study (Liszkowski & Tomasello, in press), we found that only infants who already pointed with the index-finger pointed more frequently, accompanied their points more often with vocalizations, and comprehended pointing in terms of referential intentions, compared to other same-aged infants who sometimes indicated with the whole hand. Based on these correlational findings, the aforementioned experimental evidence, and the fact that indexfinger pointing is a late-emerging joint attention behavior that is preceded by other gestures such as offers, shows, gives, and requests (Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998) , it is reasonable to believe that pointing, at least index-finger pointing, starts out with a communicative function. It may, however, be occasionally observed in noncommunicative situations, first when a communicative partner is not available or responding, and later for other private (e.g., mnemonic) functions (Delgado et al., 2009) .
Referential Intentions
There is by now good evidence that 12-month-olds also point with referential intentions to present others with a subject of their communication. For example, in the paradigm in which interesting events elicited infant pointing, we had an experimenter misidentify infants' referents and attend solely either to the infants' face or to an irrelevant object nearby the intended referent, both times emoting positively to the infant (Liszkowski et al., 2004; Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007a) . In both these cases of referential misunderstandings, infants attempted to redirect the recipient's attention by repeating their pointing to the intended referent significantly more often than when the recipient had correctly identified the referent. Further, they vocalized more and looked more often at the experimenter in cases of referential misunderstandings, providing further indications of persistence and surprise.
In these studies, infants' pointing was not simply a response to the presence of interesting stimuli. We found in further studies that infants communicated about ceased events or objects that were not present at the time of testing. For example, when infants had attended to an interesting event and it had ceased, they then pointed to its previous, now-empty location, depending on how a recipient had reacted to it before (Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007b) . Further, in a request-paradigm, to obtain a desirable object that was absent from its usual location at the moment of request, infants pointed to the now-empty location to request the absent entity (Liszkowski, Schäfer, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009 ). Communication beyond the immediate "here and now" has previously been taken to be a design feature of human language ("displacement"; Hockett, 1960) . Our findings establish for the first time that already before language, infants point with the intention to refer others to specific events and entities, and sometimes even absent referents.
Social Intentions
Because communication is a collaborative activity in which the sender and recipient both work together by aligning and helping each other to achieve mutual understanding, one question is whether infants' communication, too, is motivated by these aspects. One main finding of our studies was that infants indeed point at interesting events to share their interest about these events with others. For example, when an adult only oriented to the infant's referent but then did not comment on it (Liszkowski et al., 2004) , or when the adult commented about the referent in an unenthusiastic way and signaled that the adult's interest did not match the infant's interest (Liszkowski et al., 2007a) , infants' intention was not satisfied as reflected in their differential pattern of pointing: When the experimenter did not comment at all, infants persisted and repeated their pointing; when the experimenter's comment was uninterested instead of positive, infants did not persist but ceased pointing over trials (although they remained generally interactive with the adult throughout the experiment). Crucially, when the adult already knew about the referent (Liszkowski et al., 2007b) , infants still pointed but only if the adult had expressed interest in it, presumably to share and express their alignment with the adult's expression of attitude. These findings show that infants do not only want to share the visual focus on a referent; they want to express and share their attitudes about a referent, too. This type of expressive pointing is also used in referential proto-conversations between caregivers and infants, as indicated by a correlational use (Liszkowski & Tomasello, in press) , and instrumental in establishing common shared background knowledge (Liebal, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010) .
Another main finding of our studies was that infants also point to help others. We designed a new search paradigm in which infants were confronted with an adult searching for one of two things. Findings were that infants pointed more to the relevant than irrelevant object to help the adult find it, with no requestive accompaniments or particular interest in the object (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006) , and they did this more so when the adult needed help to find it than when she did not . More recently, we found that infants also provide information to warn others in anticipation of a negative action outcome (Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2010) . In the study, an adult experienced unforeseen negative effects (pain or disgust) when accidentally bumping into an object in the course of her play. Subsequently, she removed the object out of her way. In her absence, someone else accidentally pushed the object back into the way. When she reappeared, infants spontaneously pointed out the object, even though the experimenter did not search for anything and the object did not move in interesting ways. Infants pointed significantly less in control conditions, when the object was either positive (thus not evoking negative side effects) or the experimenter had witnessed the location change (and thus already knew about the problem). Informing others to help them find something and warning others to help them avoid something are both based on a prosocial motivation. Infants' informative pointing and warning may be the ontogenetically earliest evidence for altruistic helping without direct benefit for the self.
Social Cognitive Skills of Infant Pointing
The reported studies directly tested 12-month-olds' social cognitive understanding of others' intentional and epistemic states. In the event paradigm, infants understood others' attention as evidenced by significantly more pointing when the adult had not yet seen the event than when she already had. Infants' pointing further revealed an understanding of the adult's attitudinal relations to the referent (i.e., whether she was interested in it or not; Liszkowski et al., 2007a Liszkowski et al., , 2007b . In the search paradigm, infants understood an adult's intention to find an object and they understood whether the adult was knowledgeable or ignorant (Liszkowski et al., 2006; 2008) . The warning paradigm further clarified that infants anticipate others' actions based on an understanding of their goals and epistemic states, even in the absence of behavioral manifestations like effortful trying or search behaviors (Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2010) . The latter study suggests an emerging belief-desire psychology of action predictions in the service of collaborative communication (see Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2011 , for further evidence of 18-and 24-month-olds' productive usage of "theory-of-mind" skills in a paradigm of anticipatory correcting). Further studies on infants' comprehension of pointing show that 12-month-olds also comprehend others' pointing in terms of the pointer's underlying referential intentions (Gliga & Csibra, 2009) , and that 12-month-olds' referential understanding of pointing is bidirectional as evidenced by correlations of infants' production and comprehension of pointing to occluded referents (Behne, Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2011; Liszkowski & Tomasello, in press) .
In sum then, recent experimental findings provide a new look at infant pointing as a fully communicative act including full-fledged reference on a mental level, even to absent entities, with cooperative motives such as sharing and helping, all before language has emerged. These findings thus provide ontogenetic evidence that human communication is based on social cognitive and motivational skills that run much deeper than language alone, and are manifest in the gestural modality of deictic communication around 12 months of age.
ORIGINS OF PRELINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION
How do the core social cognitive and motivational skills of human communication emerge prior to and thus independently of language? Our knowledge in this respect is still scarce. If we think of these skills as a core cognitive processing system that is part of human cognition from the beginning (for other examples of core cognitive systems, see Spelke, 1994; Carey, 2009 ), one question is to what extent infants' prelinguistic communication skills are shared with nonhuman ancestors. Evidence for an evolutionary association would refute strong claims of social constructivism and suggest that infants' skills are inherited from the natural line of development. Another question is whether prelinguistic communication skills are in fact universal across different cultural settings. For example, if we found cross-cultural differences in their existence before language, this would make "core systems" accounts less likely and suggest an influence of sociocultural lines of development. From an individual line of development, the most central question to social origins accounts is whether infants' skills emerge through and are mediated by social-interactional input and communicative practices.
With regard to inherited skills from the evolutionary line, one thing to note is that nonhuman primates communicate in various sophisticated ways. Current research (see Call & Tomasello, 2007 , for an overview) shows that great apes' communication is most flexible in the gestural modality and clearly involves the intention to address others. However, the origins and repertoire of apes' gestures seem fundamentally different from those of humans. Most gestures are ontogenetically ritualized from individual action schemes. These gestures are thus not learned via social imitation but originate from individual chaining of abbreviated behaviors. As a consequence, quite a few of apes' gestures are idiosyncratic and not shared with other individuals. Social-cognitively, apes presumably do not understand their gestural communication from another individual's perspective, that is, bidirectionally (Tomasello, 2008) . This has striking consequences for deictic acts of reference such as pointing. Apes point in captivity for humans (Leavens, Russell, & Hopkins, 2005) but apparently not for one another, neither in the wild nor in zoos (Povinelli, Bering, & Giambrone, 2003; Tomasello, 2006) . Importantly, apes' pointing differs from that of prelinguistic human infants in at least two fundamental ways. First, apes only point to request things, usually food, but not to share interest and not to inform others helpfully (see Bullinger, Zimmermann, Kaminski, & Tomasello, 2010 ). This difference on the level of social intentions may be one of the reasons why apes also do not understand a human's pointing gesture. For example, on object choice tasks in which a human indicates one of two buckets that contains a hidden food, apes follow the point to the bucket. But unlike 12-month-olds (Behne et al., submitted) , apes do not understand why the human pointed to the bucket; that is, they presumably fail to understand the human's social intention to helpfully inform them and, therefore, do not locate the hidden referent (Tomasello, 2006) . Second, apes' pointing is also different on the level of referential intentions. In a recent study (Liszkowski et al., 2009) , apes requested a food item that was currently not visible (occluded) by approaching its location with an extended arm and/or index finger. However, unlike human 12-month-olds, they did not request a food item that was currently absent from its usual location by pointing to the empty but mutually known location. Presumably, apes do not use their pointing gestures within a shared common ground to communicate their referential intent, but to recruit help in obtaining something. Their usage of pointing is also not bidirectional, considering that they did request a concealed food item from a human but did not understand the human's informative point to a hidden reward. Apes' gestures, and in particular their pointing gestures, are thus fundamentally different from prelinguistic infants' pointing in terms of the underlying social and referential intentions and the bidirectional understanding of the communicative act.
With regard to the sociocultural line, anthropological and cross-linguistic observations may suggest that infants' prelinguistic pointing is not universal but a result of Western culture-specific practices (e.g., Wilkins, 2003) . Indeed, several developmental studies have documented infants' pointing gestures in the context of book reading (e.g., Murphy, 1978) , which is a very culture-specific activity. One suspicion is that it is only in Western cultures in which whole industries are devoted to producing numerous artifacts for infants, and in which caretakers spend a lot of time interacting, playing, and pointing for their infants, that infants point with their fingers at things before they begin to speak. This would run against the claim that pointing, and specifically index-finger pointing (Liszkowski & Tomasello, in press ), plays a pivotal role before language.
Studies to date have investigated infant pointing in North America, Europe, and Japan (see Butterworth, 2003) , but no study to date has systematically compared infants' and caregivers' pointing in a standardized setting across cultures. In a recent study (Liszkowski, Brown, C allaghan, Takada, & de Vos, 2010) , we decorated a room with a set of different items, and caregivers and infants were invited to look at these together, a situation broadly analogous to an exhibit or a visit to a zoo (based on Liszkowski & Tomasello, in press ). We used the task with babies around their first birthdays in seven different countries in India, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Japan, Mexico, Peru, and Canada-cultures that were indigenous or rural and had independent or interdependent socialization goals. Main findings were that both infants and parents spontaneously used the pointing gesture in the same context across all cultures. Most infants between 10 and 14 months of age pointed with the index finger, and did so at about the same frequency, with no significant differences across cultures. Further, caregivers' and infants' pointing was overall correlated, thus revealing a social usage of the gesture from the beginning.
We have recently also begun testing infants' comprehension of the pointing gesture across cultures. Our previous findings of infants' comprehension of reference to occluded entities (Behne et al., submitted) are amenable to culture-specific interpretations, too. For example, it is possible that infants pass the hiding-finding game only because of extensive experience with such interaction frames at home, or because Western parents generally point a lot for their infants. We conducted the identical task of Behne and colleagues with traditionally living Yucatec Mayans in Mexico. Mayan infants have been reported to be socially less engaged, and parents hold the general belief that infants' communicative development is maturational, so that they engage in comparably less interactional formats with their infants (Gaskins, 1999 (Gaskins, , 2006 Salomo & Liszkowski, 2010a , see next paragraph). We found that even the youngest Yucatec Mayan infants who we tested at 12 to 14 months of age performed virtually identically to their German counterparts as reported in Behne et al. (submitted) . The study thus shows that the comprehension of prelinguistic pointing in referential terms is not a culture-specific phenomenon. Thus, both infants' production and comprehension skills of pointing are widespread and presumably universal skills of prelinguistic human communication.
Does the evidence that infants' prelinguistic communication is uniquely human, universal across cultures, and fully fledged already a year after birth require any further developmental account of its emergence? In a word, yes. Three-month-olds are perfectly able to extent the isolated index finger, as well as their arms, but why don't 3-month-olds point? The lack of continuity from the natural evolutionary line of development further forces us to develop an ontogenetic account of the emergence of pointing. In a recent study (Salomo & Liszkowski, 2010a) , we compared the natural occurrence of triadic joint interactional formats, in which infant and interlocutor(s) were engaged together with an object for at least 30 seconds, in the daily lives of three groups of 8-to 15-month-old infants in a Yucatec Mayan village, in a midsized Dutch city in the Netherlands, and in Shanghai, China. Using a scan-sampling method across 4 hours of home visits, we found statistically significant differences: Yucatec Mayan infants spent half as much time in triadic interactions as compared to Dutch infants, who again spent half as much time as Shanghai infants. This is the first study to reveal systematic quantitative differences across cultural settings in infants' triadic social interactions as they first emerge. In a further video recording of an hour of natural observations in the
